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It is not how many votes you get, but also where you get them:
Territorial determinants and institutional hurdles for the success
of ethnic minority parties in post-communist countries
Abstract
Electoral rules have long been held as important for the success of new political parties, but research has
neglected the dimension of territory in this equation. This article argues that the territorial structure of
social groups, in interaction with the electoral system, makes a crucial difference for the ability of new
parties to enter parliament. In district-based electoral systems, social groups that are highly concentrated
face much lower hurdles with an own party than groups that are spread throughout the country. The
argument is tested on a novel database on ethnic minority groups from post-communist countries in
Europe, including 123 minorities in 19 countries. To test hypotheses with complex interaction effects
and binary variables, Qualitative Comparative Analysis appears as the most suitable method. After
controlling for size and special minority-relevant provisions in the electoral systems, there is strong
confirmation for the hypothesised effect.
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It is not how many votes you get, but also where you get them 
Territorial determinants and institutional hurdles for the success of ethnic 
minority parties in post-communist countries 
 
Abstract 
Electoral rules have long been held as important for the success of new political parties, but 
research has neglected the dimension of territory in this equation. This article argues that the 
territorial structure of social groups, in interaction with the electoral system, makes a crucial 
difference for the ability of new parties to enter parliament. In district-based electoral systems, 
social groups that are highly concentrated face much lower hurdles with an own party than 
groups which are spread throughout the country. The argument is tested on a novel database on 
ethnic minority groups from post-communist countries in Europe, including 123 minorities in 
nineteen countries. To test hypotheses with complex interaction effects and binary variables, 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) appears as the most suitable method. After controlling 
for size and special, minority-relevant provisions in the electoral systems, there is strong 
confirmation for the hypothesised effect. 
Keywords: Electoral systems; new parties; ethnic parties; post-communist countries. 
 
Introduction 
The comparative literature on the effect of electoral systems on party systems has only 
marginally addressed the dimension of the territory. All major work on electoral system 
effects on party system fractionalisation (Sartori, 1986; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 
1994; Cox, 1997; Taagepera, 2007) or on the electoral success of new or small parties 
(Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Tavits, 2006) has heavily relied on the importance of district 
 2 
 
magnitude. The concentrating effect of district magnitude on the party system, however, 
occurs solely at the local level. How it is translated to the national level, as the bulk of the 
literature implicitly assumes, is theoretically and empirically puzzling (Amorim Neto & Cox, 
1997: 168; Ordeshook & Shvetsova, 1994: 109). Studies that solely focus on the effect of 
electoral systems at the national level produce very convincing results for most Western 
democracies, but mostly regard parties with an almost homogeneous level of support across 
the country. 
Differently, this study investigates the effect of electoral systems on the electoral success 
of new political parties under particular consideration of the territorial structure of the party 
support. It looks at the most basic question of electoral success—the ability of a new party to 
enter parliament. The electoral system element that is the most common focal point for this 
question, small electoral districts, only has a concentrating effect on national party systems if 
parties win a fairly similar vote share in all parts of a country. In this case, small parties 
would get low vote shares in every electoral district, and fail to win seats if the districts are 
small. Recent research on the territorial structure of political parties (Chhibber & Kollman, 
1998; Caramani, 2004; Harbers, 2008) has shown that there are wide differences among 
parties. Heavily nationalised parties rely on rather homogeneous rates of electoral support 
across a polity, while the votes of weakly nationalised parties are territorially concentrated, 
which is typically the case for territorial cleavages. So far, the political effects of party 
nationalisation have, however, been systematically addressed by only a few studies. 
The study of new parties’ success is methodologically challenging, since potential new 
parties might often anticipate whether they might enter parliament, and where they deem their 
chances to be small, they may not be created, and may not run in elections (Hug, 2003). 
Given that new parties are a self-selected population, studies that solely investigate parties 
and distinguish successful ones from others, will renounce on the bulk of the negative cases – 
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parties that have not even been created. To avoid this problem, I study party formation and 
success along ethnic divides in post-communist countries in Europe, looking at 123 ethnic 
minority groups in nineteen countries. Ethnic identities in this region are strong, clear-cut, 
strongly politicised, and have existed long before the current party systems. Unlike most 
other parties in post-communist countries, new ethnic parties belong to the most stable ones 
in the region, with a loyal electorate, so that our results are robust over time. Empirical tests 
of complex conjunctions of explanatory factors rely on the Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) method (Ragin, 1987, 2000). 
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss how previous work has 
addressed the success of new political parties. This is followed by an examination of the 
institutional explanation with an emphasis on the territorial dimension. Section 3 presents the 
research design, while the QCA methodology and the operationalisation are presented in 
section 4. Results are discussed in section 5, and posited in a wider context in section 6. 
 
1. Explaining the emergence of new political parties 
The literature has identified several factors that are relevant for the potential success of new 
parties. Key explanations include the role of institutional rules, the strategic behaviour of 
other political actors, and the new parties’ own resources (Harmel & Robertson, 1985 offer 
an overview over this literature). 
New political parties are usually successful when they “fill representational needs of the 
society” (Harmel & Robertson, 1985: 502), or react to crises in the expressive function of 
established parties (Ignazi, 1996; Sikk, 2006). Typically, they address voters along new 
political divides, such as the post-materialist divide, revived ethno-regional divides, 
xenophobia, or the revival of former communist parties.1 
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The cartelisation theory has built on the idea that established political parties will try to 
reduce party competition in order to secure their power in political office, for instance 
through restrictive party regulations or electoral laws. Small electoral districts and majority or 
plurality voting rules makes it difficult for new parties to enter parliament (Hauss & Rayside, 
1978; Birnir, 2004). While Harmel & Robertson (1985) hold that new parties are easier 
created in parliamentary systems, Golder (2006) argues that they might emerge from coattail 
effects from presidential candidatures. Difficulties for new political parties to become 
registered and to win the first seat in parliament, might, however not only affect their chances 
of entering parliament, but likewise affect their electoral strength (Hug, 2001). 
The established political parties might also try to inhibit the entry of new competitors 
through incorporation of their political requests, trying to keep the issues of new parties from 
becoming salient (Meguid, 2005; Hauss & Rayside, 1978; Kitschelt, 1988), so that new 
parties can affect the positioning of existing parties (Harmel & Svåsand, 1997). 
New political parties try to pass the institutional thresholds and compete against the 
action of established political parties with costly campaigns. Hauss and Rayside (1978) have 
argued that a strong personal and organisational basis is important for the success of new 
political parties. However, resources alone do not guarantee electoral success: they need to be 
linked to a new electoral niche (Sikk, 2006). 
 
2. The institutional framework: Necessary conditions for new parties’ success 
The focus on electoral laws and new issues or cleavages emerges as one of the most 
prominent explanations of new parties’ electoral success. This section explains how the 
territorial structure of voter groups, which is related to new issues or cleavages, makes a 
difference for institutional models. 
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In the cleavage-institutional model, the emergence of political parties is explained as the 
manifestation of a social cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Electoral systems set a hurdle 
for the emergence of political parties (Duverger, 1951; Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). The 
model for the explanation of the success of new political parties relies mainly on a dichotomy 
of PR versus majoritarian vote (Harmel & Robertson, 1985), on district magnitude (Meguid, 
2005; Tavits, 2006), and legal thresholds (Hug, 2001; Moraski & Loewenberg, 1999, etc.) as 
explanatory variables. They particularly affect the chances of a party of getting represented in 
parliament—a key variable related to a new party’s success. Most studies treat district 
magnitude m and legal electoral thresholds Tleg as almost equivalent aspects of electoral laws, 
or combine them in effective thresholds Teff (Lijphart & Gibberd, 1977; Pennisi, 1998). If a 
country has very large districts, then the threshold of exclusion Tex is low, whereas small 
districts impose high thresholds of exclusions, according to equation 1. 
 
1
1
+
=
m
Tex  (1) 
 
If the threshold of exclusion Tex is low, but a considerable legal threshold applies, it might be 
more relevant. Hence, the effective threshold corresponds to the higher of both thresholds 
(equation 2).  
 Teff = max (Tex, Tleg) = max (1 / (m+1), Tleg) (2) 
 
In electoral systems with substantial thresholds, only the largest parties within an electoral 
district have chances to be elected. New parties need to bear very considerable costs in order 
to break the dominance of established parties, in that they must build a very solid basis of 
voters. 
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Many studies stop here, neglecting the territorial dimension of voting. While legal 
thresholds usually apply at the national level, setting out a minimally required share of the 
national votes for a party to be represented, the effect of electoral districts is a local one, 
limited to the area that is covered by an electoral district. Small political parties with many 
votes in one or a few electoral districts are much better off than those with a nationally 
homogeneous vote share (Taagepera, 1998). Their locally concentrated votes allow them to 
win mandates in certain electoral districts, while not competing or gaining only few votes 
elsewhere. I f all votes are concentrated in only one electoral district (which heavily relies on 
the districting process), we can calculate the threshold of exclusion for parties with a 
territorially concentrated electorate. According to equation 1, any party can win a seat in a 
district of magnitude m with a vote share of 1/(m+1) of all district votes. If the district counts 
a proportion of q of the overall number of voters in the country, the threshold to enter 
parliament for a locally concentrated party amounts to q/(m+1). Usually, the share of the 
national voters living in a local district is approximately equal to the share of seats that is 
allocated in this district,2 so that if there are overall S seats in parliament, the proportion of 
voters living in the district amounts to m/S. This allows me to establish the proportion of 
national votes for party with a locally concentrated electorate to enter parliament, Treg. 
 
1
1
+
⋅=
m
m
S
Treg  (3) 
For instance, for single-seat districts, district magnitude is one (m=1), so that the threshold of 
exclusion amounts to 1/2S. For large district magnitudes, the formula converges to 1/S. 
Small parties, whose electorate is dispersed throughout the country, need to win approxi-
mately the vote share of the national threshold of exclusion, Tex, in order to enter parliament. 
Accordingly, they will favour large PR districts, which have a lower threshold of exclusion 
than small districts (cf. OSCE/ODIHR, 2001). Small electoral districts discriminate between 
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parties with a territorially concentrated and dispersed electorate, while national legal 
thresholds do not do so. 
Empirical proof founded on the distinction between concentrated and non-concentrated 
groups of voters and the role of electoral districts is not known to the author. Mozaffar et al. 
(2003) employed a similar idea, arguing that electoral systems with small districts were an 
institutional filter against the fractionalisation of the party system, except in the case where 
social groups were significantly concentrated. Empirical results, based on a study of ethnic 
diversity, do not, however, support the hypothesis.3 
Studies that deal with the impact of electoral systems on new parties usually look only at 
the core characteristics of electoral systems that have been discussed above. Special electoral 
rules which facilitate or guarantee the representation of certain communal groups are only 
looked at exceptionally (Lijphart, 1986). Such are either group-specific quotas within districts 
or non-territorial districts, which unify all voters of a social group. The representation of 
territorially concentrated groups can be guaranteed through specifically designed territorial 
electoral districts. 
In brief, I expect that the success of small new parties in elections (here defined as 
winning at least a seat in parliament) relies on the size of their potential electorate, its degree 
of concentration and the electoral rules. A new political party can be successful: 
- if its potential electorate outnumbers the effective threshold (given through the district 
magnitude) and the national legal threshold, 
- if its potential electorate is concentrated and outnumbers both the regional threshold 
(given through the district magnitude and the number of seats in parliament) and the 
national legal threshold, 
- if its potential voters elect their representatives according to special rules, in a special, 
non-territorial district, or according to a group-specific quota. 
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3. Research design 
The study of the emergence of new parties is methodologically challenging, since they are a 
self-selected population. Negative cases of successful new parties are those that failed to win 
representation and those that were not created or did not compete in elections (Hug, 2003). 
To circumvent the self-selection problem, this investigation relies on social divides as units of 
investigation. This allows the estimation of the electoral potential of a political party that 
competes along a social divide, and the distinction between cases where such parties were 
created and won seats in parliament from negative cases where social divides did not 
engender any political party (see Kitschelt, 1988; Meguid, 2005 for a similar design). 
In Western democracies, new social divides are rare, though often-employed exceptions 
are ethno-regional or post-materialist cleavages. The potential electoral strength of a new 
party can often be established only vaguely, as voting behaviour along new social divides is 
not homogeneous enough. Many cleavages do not have a territorial dimension, so that they 
do not allow the investigation of this aspect of my model empirically. Differently, ethnic 
identities in the post-communist countries in Europe are strong and clear-cut, and the size of 
ethnic groups can be established from census data or alternative sources. Unlike most other 
social divides in young democracies and especially in post-communist countries, ethnicity is 
arguably the most stable cleavage of party mobilisation (Bugajski, 1995; Stein, 2000; Birnir, 
2007). Most parties of ethnic minorities emerged soon after the introduction of competitive 
elections, and unlike other parties, they could count on a very stable electorate. At the time of 
party creation during and after the transition to democracy at the end of the 20th century, all 
ethnic identities in the region were long in existence, so that endogeneity problems (attached 
to cleavage-based explanations of party systems) appear less salient in this case. Furthermore, 
the territorial concentration of ethnic groups and the key aspects of the electoral systems vary 
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considerably in Central and Eastern European countries, and there is no country with very 
heterogeneous district size (which would be problematic for the calculation of the threshold 
of exclusion). 
The creation of parties on an ethnic basis has been subject to a number of studies 
(Horowitz, 1985; Reilly, 2001; Chandra, 2004, 2005; De Winter, 2001; Levi & Hechter, 
1985; Mitchell, 1995; Van Cott, 2003, etc.), including several with a special focus on Central 
and Eastern Europe (Stein, 2000) and on electoral system effects (Juberías, 2000; Friedman, 
2005; Moser, 2005; Kostadinova, 2007; Bochsler, 2010). Similarly to the general literature on 
new parties, work on ethnic parties praises PR with large districts or specially designed 
districts for ethnic minorities as a way to include minority groups into politics (Lijphart, 
1986; Rule & Zimmerman, 1994, etc.). Doorenspleet (2005: 366) is by far not the only author 
to claim that “majority rule is dangerous in divided societies, because minorities that are 
continually denied access to political power will feel excluded and discriminated against by 
the regime”. The territorial dimension and its importance gets only a few lines of mention in 
the seminal contributions to the field (Norris, 2004: 212). It appears, thus, as particularly 
interesting to test my model of new party creation on parties of ethnic minorities. 
I have constructed a new database for the study that includes information about political 
parties and their ethnic affiliation, electoral laws, and the size and territorial structure of 123 
ethnic minority groups (see also Bochsler, 2010). The inclusion of very heterogeneous 
sources, both from government offices as from human rights and minority rights 
organisations, makes me confident of having identified the most relevant groups that are 
associated with an ethnic identity.4 Given the low variance over time on all variables, I use a 
cross-sectional design considering the latest legislative electoral contest (first chamber) in the 
Central and Eastern European countries by the end of 2007.5 Every ethnic minority in each of 
the investigated countries is coded as one case. I investigate minorities from Albania to 
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Ukraine (cases are listed in table 3), excluding Belarus and Russia from the analysis, as they 
lack democratic standards of elections, and because the Russian parliament counted a very 
large number of independent candidates whose ethnic affiliation is not identifiable. The 
model presented in this article allows me to test the interaction effects of the territorial 
structure and size of ethnic minorities on the one hand and the electoral rules for ethnic 
minority parties on the other hand. 
 
4. Methodology and operationalisation: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
I have argued apart from the commonly praised PR with large districts, there are several paths 
that allow for the representation of new political parties, but none of them is sufficient. The 
parties’ potential relies on further aspects, such as the size and the territorial structure of the 
potential electorate of a party. The model with several alternative paths and multiple 
interaction terms, tested on only 123 cases, does not lead to stable results when tested with 
probabilistic methods.6 However, the hypotheses ideally correspond to what Ragin (1987) 
call “multiple conjunctional causality”. Given further that most of the explanatory variables 
employed in this study and the dependent variable are dichotomous by nature (see below for 
the operationalisation), crisp-set QCA appears as the most-suited method of analysis. The 
method systematically identifies paths and combinations of conditions, which lead to a 
positive or negative outcome. 
QCA follows a deterministic concept, identifying necessary and sufficient conditions, 
which—if violated by only one or a few cases—are modified or dismissed. With larger 
numbers of cases, a deterministic strategy becomes challenging. It is likely that certain cases 
with the same configuration of condition variables, but different outcomes exist, which is a 
problematic result from a deterministic perspective (Ragin, 2000: 133; Rihoux & Ragin, 
2008: 48-56). In my analysis with a considerable number of cases, such contradictory 
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outcomes should not astonish. My hypotheses identify only necessary, but no sufficient 
conditions. For this reason, even in a deterministic logic, heterogeneous configurations are 
not contradictory. Rather, the data suggests that cases with either positive or negative 
outcomes belong to the set of necessary conditions, but the conditions of these configurations 
with heterogeneous outcomes are not sufficient for a positive outcome. 
 
Operationalisation and notation 
My analysis investigates for each identified ethnic minority group whether an ethnic minority 
party (or a list representing the minority) has won seats in the national parliament while 
competing independently7 in the most recent elections before the end of 2007. Following the 
common notation in QCA, my outcome variable for representation is coded in capital letters, 
R, when the value is positive, while r indicates negative values (no representation with an 
own party in parliament). Explanatory or condition variables are listed in table 1. For mixed 
electoral systems, which are quite frequent in the region, combining the allocation of one part 
of the seats by PR, and another by majority vote, I distinguish both parts of the seat 
allocation. This is motivated by the idea that new parties might win seats in the majoritarian, 
in the PR part, or in both. In mixed systems, PR district magnitude (D) relates to the PR part 
of the system, and the threshold (T) relates to the legal threshold in the PR part of the system. 
Further, I take the number of PR seats in parliament into account (P). A separate variable (M) 
relates to the number of seats in the majoritarian tier of mixed electoral systems (table 1).8 S 
identifies special, ethnically-defined districts for ethnic minorities or special quotas. 
Legislations that forbid ethnically-defined parties are controlled for (variable B). The 
question of whether or not to include these cases might be delicate. Addressing such 
“impossible-but-happens cases”, Mahoney and Goertz (2004) argue that they are relevant for 
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empirical studies. This allows for proper consideration of positive outcomes, which on first 
sight might seem impossible.9 
xxx include table 1 about here xxx 
 
Formalisation of the hypotheses 
Boolean algebra uses both signs + (addition) and * (multiplication) in order to show how 
variables (conditions) are linked. The addition sign (+) stands for the logical “or”, while the 
multiplication sign (*) means a logical “and”. The notation “C+t” hence means that an ethnic 
minority is concentrated (C) or that it is smaller than the legal electoral threshold (t). The 
notation “Ct” however would mean that an ethnic group is concentrated and that it is smaller 
than the threshold. This allows me to formulate my hypotheses in formal terms. 
I have formulated three alternative paths that allow the entry of a new political party. 
 
a) The parties’ potential electorate is large enough to pass the threshold imposed by the 
magnitude of the PR districts (D) and the national legal threshold that applies in some PR 
systems (T). 
 DT->R 
b) The parties’ potential electorate is concentrated (C), and it is large enough to pass the 
threshold imposed by the size of parliament (P for PR seats, M for majority seats). 
 For PR systems or the PR part of mixed electoral systems, considering also the limits 
imposed through national legal thresholds (T): 
 CPT->R 
For the single-seat district part of mixed electoral systems (where legal thresholds do not 
apply): 
 CM->R 
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c) Or, if its potential voters elect their representatives according to special rules (S), thus in a 
special, non-territorial district, or according to group-specific quota. 
 S->R 
 
Given the specific empirical case of application, I add an additional necessary condition that 
needs to be fulfilled in all these paths, namely electoral systems with a ban on ethnic minority 
parties (B) do not allow the representation of such. 
 b->R 
Overall, the paths that have been sketched, and the necessary condition of an absence of a ban 
on ethnic parties, can be summarised in a comprehensive formula displaying a combination 
of conditions that are jointly necessary towards the outcome, which looks as follows: 
 b* (DT+CPT+CM+S)->R 
  
Certainly, for the creation of a new party, more is needed than just an electoral system that 
allows for its potential creation. The success of ethnic minority parties might rely on further 
aspects, such as the existence of multiple parties that compete for the votes of ethnic 
minorities, or the presence of mixed-ethnic political parties that address ethnic minority 
voters. These aspects, however, might rather be a consequence than a cause of the existence 
of ethnic minority parties, so that their inclusion in the model might flaw the results. For the 
sake of simplicity, and in order to avoid possible problems of endogeneity, I have left further 
aspects, such as the degree uniformity of the voting behaviour of potential supporters, the 
extent to which other parties might try to attract their electorate, or the organisational and 
financial capacities of a new party, apart. The necessary character of my hypotheses reflects 
that the electoral system and the demographic structure of the minority alone do not explain 
the emergence of minority parties, but rather allow or hinder it. 
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5. Empirical analysis and results 
This section illustrates the empirical analysis and presents the results. The database lists 43 
minority groups for which at least a party ran in national parliamentary elections, and 34 out 
of these parties won seats in parliament (table 2).10 
xxx include table 2 about here xxx 
 
The classification according to the condition variables (table 3, left part) leaves us with 27 
empirical configurations. For eight configurations, outcomes are always positive: all ethnic 
minorities within these configurations are represented by their own minority party in 
parliament. Fourteen groups are always coded negatively (no ethnic minority parties), while 
the remaining five groups of cases are mixed: some of the ethnic minorities classified there 
are represented by their own parties in parliament; others are not. As I have formulated 
necessary conditions, contradicting configurations can be treated jointly with the 
configurations with positive outcomes: the necessary conditions for the success of an ethnic 
minority party are fulfilled, but this does not always mean that such a party will be created 
(cf. Ragin, 1987). 
 
xxx include table 3 about here xxx 
 
Using Boolean algebra, the 27 configurations can be reduced to a formula with four paths, 
identifying the conditions for positive outcomes (table 4).11 Positive outcomes can be 
observed for each of the four paths, and none of the paths is superfluous. This gives us 
confidence that the hypothesis fits the empirical data, and that it is not overly complex. 
 
xxx include table 4 about here xxx 
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The empirical formula looks more complicated than my hypothesis. While the equation again 
represents the four paths of the hypothesis (bold part of the formula), certain additional 
conditions are added on the right (narrow typing). All these aspects are solely empirical con-
ditions, added due to limited empirical diversity. As common in QCA, not all possible 
configurations of condition variables are observed. Seven dichotomous condition variables 
would result in 27=128 possible configurations, but only 27 occur. For instance, there is no 
electoral system that combines majoritarian voting with special districts for ethnic minorities, 
so that there is no empirical information for the combination SM, while the combination Sm 
exists. I would expect that both lead to a positive outcome. Other combinations of variables 
are theoretically implausible or impossible: the regional threshold (related to P) is never 
higher than the effective national threshold (related to D), and therefore, cases with D (group 
large enough to win a PR-district seat) are theoretically a subset of P (group large enough to 
win a PR-seat). I renounce on the frequent practice to include counterfactuals (non-occurring 
“logical remainders” (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008: 59-65)) automatically, as they might lead to 
artificial contradictions of the theoretically derived hypotheses.12 Instead, the simplification 
through inclusion of logical remainders in a theoretically informed way (Stokke, 2007: 509; 
Rihoux & Ragin, 2008: 135-136; Ragin, 2008: 160-172), shows that the empirically resulting 
formula corresponds to the hypothesised formula (table 4, bold typing). As the positive 
outcome, the negative outcomes can also be summarised in a formula (see online appendix 
C). 
The emergence of new political parties, or in this case of ethnic minority parties, depends 
on the size and the territorial structure of their potential electorate and, as well as on electoral 
laws. While in some countries ethnic groups of just tenths of percents hold parliamentary 
seats, other electoral laws hinder even relatively large groups of voters from being 
represented in parliament. The hypothesised effect of concentration is particularly relevant 
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for the explanation of the outcomes. In some cases, under a mixed electoral system, parties of 
concentrated minority groups were able to win majoritarian seats, such as parties of ethnic 
Poles in Lithuania or Greeks in Albania. The party of the Poles in Lithuania, however, does 
not pass the legal threshold that applies in the PR tier.13 Also, parties with a concentrated 
electorate enter parliament (Germans in Poland), while in very similar situations (e.g. 
configuration no. 23), parties organising non-concentrated minorities were not able to do so. 
In sum, parties with a large potential electorate may be represented through every kind of 
PR, through special districts, or through mixed electoral systems (however, there are no 
empirical cases which confirm this last configuration). Parties with a medium-sized potential 
electorate do best with PR without thresholds or with systems with special districts. If their 
voters are territorially concentrated, they may be represented through a mixed electoral 
system as well. Parties with a low electoral potential, rely on need special districts, PR with 
very large districts, or (if their voters are regionally very concentrated) a mixed electoral 
system. (There is no empirical evidence for the last configuration.) Especially for 
geographically non-concentrated groups of voters, representation in parliament with an own 
party is often difficult or even impossible to achieve, except for the case when the groups are 
large or can vote in special electoral districts.14 
The configurations with heterogeneous outcomes (groups 9-13) merit further attention. 
Even if the electoral systems in these cases allow for the creation of minority parties, other 
reasons might explain why in these very similar cases some minorities are represented, and 
others are not. Russian-speaking minorities in several countries (Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine) 
are not represented by their own parties, even if the electoral laws would allow so, which 
might possibly be explained through other, overlapping cleavages.15 Further exceptions might 
be due to a recent change of the electoral rules, after the party system was already largely 
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established (Serbia), or to errors resulting from the rudimentary measure of the degree of 
concentration. 
 
6. Conclusion: Territory matters 
The scholarly discussion on the effect of electoral systems on the emergence of new political 
parties has widely relied on the characteristics of the electoral system, such as district 
magnitude and national legal thresholds, and on the size of the potential electorate. However, 
the effect of district magnitude and of legal thresholds depends heavily on the question 
whether voters are homogeneously spread across the country. This is not the case for many 
new parties, especially for those that mobilise along ethnic divides (De Winter & Türsan, 
1998; Stein, 2000; Birnir, 2007; Van Cott, 2003; Mozaffar et al., 2003). 
This study shows that both the territorial structure of the voting group and often overlooked 
instruments of the electoral system, such as special minority districts or ethnic quotas, can 
make a crucial difference. Parties that address territorially concentrated groups of voters have 
better chances of getting elected to parliament in district-based electoral systems than parties 
whose voters are spread across the country.16 After considering the territorial dimension and 
subtleties of electoral systems that are usually not looked at in systematic comparative studies 
on this subject, my study allows an accurate institutional explanation of the success of parties 
of ethnic minorities. 
Looking at 123 ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, this article presents four 
ways how parties of ethnic minorities obtain representation in national parliaments. Electoral 
systems with considerable legal thresholds or with small PR districts allow parties 
representing a large minority to access parliament. Small parties in district-based electoral 
systems are better off if their electorate is concentrated on certain areas. This is especially the 
case for electoral systems with single-seat districts, where representation of minorities 
depends solely on the territorial pattern of their settlement. To allow minority parties 
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representation despite restrictive electoral systems, certain countries apply special electoral 
rules, which guarantee the representation of their minorities on a non-territorial basis. 
Certainly, the question whether minority parties can become represented is only one out 
of many criteria that matter for the choice of the constitutional order in divided societies. 
Similarly relevant are questions whether the electoral system generates a premium on 
moderation, or whether it allows for competition among parties of the same group. It is also 
worth noting that rules that discriminate (positively) on the basis of ethnicity might impose 
problems of the identification of members of ethnic groups. 
Finally, the choice of the electoral system is more delicate than simply choosing between 
a PR and majoritarian systems and preferential voting rules. For each party, the effect of 
electoral systems highly depends on the territorial structure of the electorate. 
 
                                                 
1 For instance Inglehart (1981), Kitschelt (1995), Ignazi (1996), Moraski & Loewenberg (1999), Meguid (2005), 
Minkenberg and Perrineau (2007) or Tronconi (2006). 
2 At the absence of malapportionment, the rate of voters per mandate should be approximately constant across 
all electoral districts. 
3 The study of African elections by Mozaffar et al. (2003: 386-387) shows that the investigation of joint effects 
of electoral systems and social cleavages merits deepening. Mozaffar and colleagues come however to a hard-
to-explain positive impact of concentrated ethnic group if district magnitude is large (positive impact of the 
triple interaction variable magnitude*ethnic fractionalisation*concentration). This is contrary to their 
expectations, according to which for concentrated ethnic groups district magnitude should not matter. Mozaffar 
et al. (2003: 386) argue that, “increased number of group cleavages encourages candidates to forge inter-group 
alliances to improve on their electoral gains”. It remains unclear why this should be less the case if district 
magnitude is large and groups are concentrated (as their results suggest). Brambor et al. (2007) have refined the 
analysis, but their results – as the original analysis – still show in the opposite direction of common 
expectations. 
4 Ethnic minorities are numeric minorities in a country. Ethnicity refers here to the self-definition or social 
definition of social groups that are considered to have common characteristics, even if such characteristics are 
often socially constructed. 
Ethnic minority parties define themselves explicitly or implicitly as representatives of an ethnic group and their 
program is focussed on a conservation or improvement of rights of their minority group; see Horowitz (1985: 
291), including as well parties with a clear ethnic agenda. 
5 Only in two cases, the parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities has changed after the mid-1990s in a 
major way. One case is Serbia, where ethnic minority parties were increasingly represented starting with the 
2007 national parliamentary elections, after the 5% national threshold has been abolished for minority parties. 
The other case is Estonia, with parties of the Russian-speaking minorities gaining seats in 1995 and 1999, before 
they were challenged by the Centre Party’s appeal to minorities, split, and became marginal after losing 
parliamentary representation in 2003. 
6 Probabilistic methods of analysis hardly yield any results at standard levels of statistical significance, as the 
number of cases is too small for the fairly complex form of the hypothesised interaction terms, especially since 
outcomes can only be measured dichotomously. 
7 Especially in Serbia and in Macedonia, ethnic minority parties often join the electoral lists of non-ethnic 
parties, in order to circumvent restrictive electoral rules. Such minority parties do not have the same autonomy 
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and independence as parties with their own list, and are not identifiable separately on the ballot. This is well-
illustrated by a case from Serbia, in 2005, when the non-ethnic Democratic Party (DS) attempted to headlock its 
small electoral partner, the Bosniak minority’s “Lista za Sandžak”, when the minority party wanted to enter 
government (while DS stayed in opposition). As a lack of their own electoral list, they entirely depended on the 
DS to replace their MPs. 
8 In mixed electoral systems, voting behaviour and strategic choices of political parties are often influenced both 
by PR rules and by the single-seat districts simultaneously (Cox & Schoppa, 2002; Ferrara, Herron, & 
Nishikawa, 2005). However, the necessary conditions on which this study focuses, rely heavily on the 
mechanical effect of electoral systems. In this regard, each part of mixed electoral systems works independently, 
and this is reflected by the operationalisation of this study. 
In Albania, 40 (out of 140) PR seats are allocated in order to provide overall proportionality of votes and seats 
(cf. Massicotte & Blais, 1999), with a 2.5% legal threshold. There, I treat the 100 majoritarian seats as in other 
mixed electoral systems, while the compensatory PR tier is treated as a 140-seats district with a 2.5% threshold. 
9 Legislation in Albania and in Bulgaria bans political parties founded on ethnic grounds (Cesid, 2002; Juberías, 
2000). Nevertheless, one important minority party in each of both countries has been tolerated all over the post-
communist period under non-ethnic label, the parties of Turks in Bulgaria (“Movement of Rights and Freedom”) 
and of Greeks in Albania (“Human Rights Union Party”). 
10 Parties of the following minorities ran in elections, but did not enter parliament: Roma in Bulgaria and in 
Hungary; Bosniaks in Montenegro; Moravians in the Czech Republic; Russians in Estonia, Moldova and 
Ukraine; Serbs and Turks in Macedonia. In three cases (Bosniaks in Montenegro, Russians in Estonia, Russians 
in Ukraine), the conditions would have been fulfilled, according to my hypotheses, to enter parliament, but the 
parties could not rely on a sufficiently united electorate of the ethnic minority. In the six other cases, the 
electoral system is too restrictive. 
11 The analysis is carried out with the software Tosmana, which allows the user to find parsimonious terms. 
Positive and contradictory outcomes are merged, as the hypothesis suggests only necessary, but no sufficient 
conditions. 
12 Logical remainders might include configurations that were not expected to belong to the hypothesised 
solution, and result in a formula that seemingly contradicts the hypotheses, bare any empirical proof, and based 
solely on an artificial attribution of counterfactuals. A formula with an extensive use of logical remainders is 
presented in the online appendix C. 
13 The Polish minority in Lithuania is heavily concentrated—mainly in the areas surrounding Vilnius—and they 
are a clear majority in two (out of 71) single-seat districts, where most of the Lithuanian Poles live. The Russian 
minority, which is larger in numbers, is more spread, so that a Russian minority party would lose in nearly all 
single-seat districts, and remain heavily underrepresented. 
14 The group that arguably suffers most under its territorial spread are Roma and Ashkali minorities. Alternative 
explanations put forward that Roma and Ashkali lacked effective political organisations (Sobotka, 2001; 
Alionescu, 2004: 62). Others, however, stress that attempts to organise the Roma minority has been 
substantially supported by the international community (Barany, 2005: 83). Roma or Ashkali parties only 
succeed, where profit from special electoral rules, either special PR quotas (Kosovo), reserved ethnic minority 
seats and an exception from the national legal threshold (Romania), or a lowered electoral threshold for ethnic 
minorities (Serbia). In Macedonia, a Roma party has in certain elections had access to parliament in an electoral 
alliance with a mainstream party. 
15 In Lithuania, the Labour party addresses many ethnic Russian voters. In earlier elections, Russian parties 
formed coalitions with non-ethnically defined parties (Jurkynas, 2005: 775-776). Besides a mixed-ethnic party 
or mixed-ethnic coalitions, there is not a lot of space to form a Russian minority party. In Estonia, Russians have 
recently voted heavily for the mixed-ethnic Centre party and votes of the remaining Russian speakers were split 
on several smaller parties (Mikkel, 2006). In Ukraine, several overlapping conflicts heavily correlate with the 
conflict between Russians and Ukrainians (Birch, 2000). Bosniaks in Montenegro used to have their own party 
in parliament until 1998 (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1998: 7), but voted mostly for 
non-ethnically defined parties thereafter. 
16 For other questions, such as the number of seats that a minority party wins in parliament in single-seat district 
systems, or the degree to which minority views are affecting policy outcomes, local concentration might also 
work at the group’s disadvantage. See King (1990) for partisan biases arising from local concentration, and 
Cameron et al .(1996) for policy consequences. 
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Tables  
 
It is not how many votes you get, but also where you get them. Territorial determinants and 
institutional hurdles for the success of ethnic minority parties in post-communist countries 
 
Name Description and importance Definition of positive coding 
Outcome variables (dependent variable) 
R Representation of minority group with own 
party  (elected with an own list),  
At least one party exists that is related to the ethnic minority 
and won parliamentary seats with an own list (negative: other 
cases). 
(The variable is based on the results from the most recent 
national elections, as of 2007.) 
Condition variables (explanatory variables) 
C Regional concentration of the population group. An overwhelming majority of the ethnic minority group is 
located in a small part of the country. (There is no systematic 
data to operationalise this condition more precisely.) 
D 
 
PR system: number of seats in an average 
electoral district in relation to the (countrywide) 
population share of the minority group. 
The minority population share is large enough to win a seat in 
an average PR district. 
* Indicator: p * (m+1) ≥ 1 
In countries with nationwide seat allocation, the district 
magnitude is equal to the number of PR seats in parliament. 
P 
 
PR system (or PR element in mixed system): 
number of PR seats in parliament in relation to 
the (countrywide) population share of the 
minority group. 
The population share of the minority corresponds to at least 
one PR seat* in parliament. 
* Indicator: p * s * (m+1)/m ≥ 1 
M 
 
Majority vote system (or majoritarian element 
in mixed system): Number of seats in 
parliament accorded by majority vote in single-
seat districts, in relation to the (countrywide) 
population share of the minority group. 
The population share of the minority corresponds to at least 
one district seat* in parliament. 
* Indicator: p * dS ≥ 1 
In systems pure PR systems, the indicator results in 0. 
T Vote share required according to national legal 
threshold in the PR elections or in the PR tier of 
mixed systems in relation to the population 
share of the minority group. 
The population share of the minority is equal or larger than 
1.5 times the threshold, or if ethnic minority parties are 
exempted from the threshold requirement. 
S Members of ethnic minorities elect their 
parliamentary representatives in special 
districts. 
Ethnic minorities that vote in special ethic districts. In Croatia, 
where several minorities compete in the same constituency, 
the variable is coded positively only for the largest ethnic 
group in each constituency.  
B Ban on parties from ethnic minorities. Some 
counter-legal exceptions exist: some parties are 
tolerated despite their ethnic character. 
Legal ban on ethnic minority parties (de-facto exceptions of 
the legal ban are coded negatively). 
Table 1: Operationalisation of the variables, notation, and dichotomisation. 
Notation: m = average district magnitude; p = population share of the minority group; s = overall number 
of seats in parliament; dS = number of single-seat districts. Sources, see online appendix B. 
 
  Minority party runs in national 
parliamentary elections 
  no yes Total 
Minority 
party wins 
seats in 
elections 
no 80 9 89 
yes 0 34 34 
Total 80 43 123 
Table 2: Ethnic minority parties in elections and winning parliamentary seats. 
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1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 HR-SE 
2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 HR-MU 
3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 HR-HU,RO-SE,RO-SK,RO-TA,RO-TU 
4 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 CG-AL,KO-BO,KO-GO,KO-SE,KO-TU,RO-HU 
5 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 RO-RO 
6 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 RO-GE,RO-UK 
7 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 SLO-HU,SLO-IT 
8 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 KO-RO 
9 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 C AL-GR,LI-RU 
10 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 C 
BG-TU,BiH-BO,BiH-SE,CG-SE,ES-RU,LV-RU,SE-CG,SE-
RO,SE-YU 
11 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 C 
BiH-HR,CG-BO,MA-AL,SE-AL,SE-BO,SE-HR,SE-HU,SE-
RM,SE-SK,SE-VL,SK-HU,UK-RU 
12 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 C LI-BE,LI-PO 
13 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 C MA-BO, PL-GE ,SLO-SE 
14 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 AL-RO,AL-VL 
15 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 AL-MA,AL-SLA 
16 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 BG-RO,BG-SLA,BG-VL 
17 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 BG-MA 
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CG-RO,CZ-GE,CZ-HU,CZ-RO,CZ-UK,ES-FI,HR-RO,HR-
SLO,HU-SK,LV-LI,SK-GE,SK-PO,UK-AR,UK-JE,UK-TA 
19 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 CZ-MO,CZ-PO,CZ-SK,LV-BE 
20 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CG-HR,CZ-SI,HU-JE,HU-SLA,LI-UK,LV-UK,SK-RT,UK-GR
21 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 ES-BE,ES-UK,LV-PO
22 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 HU-GE ,HU-RO 
23 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 MA-RO,MA-SE,MA-TU,SLO-HR 
24 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 MA-VL,PL-UK,SE-GE,SE-MA,SE-RU,SE-SLO,SLO-RO 
25 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
MD-RO,MD-RU,MD-UK,SK-CZ,SK-RO,UK-BE,UK-MD,UK-
PL 
26 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 CG-MU,MD-BG,MD-GA,UK-BG,UK-CT,UK-HU,UK-RM 
27 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
PL-BE,SE-BC,SE-BG,SE-CZ,SE-GO,SE-MO,SE-RT,SE-
UK,SLO-BO,SLO-YU 
Table 3: QCA “Truth Table”, variables determining the representation of ethnic minority parties 
123 ethnic minority groups are arranged in 27 groups according the independent variables.  
Cases with positive outcome are indicated in italics. 
(Abbreviations of the cases, see online appendix A). 
 
 
hypotheses additional empirical conditions (subset) outcome 
b *  ( DT *Pm 
 + CPT *sm 
 + CM *DPs 
 + S *m (Pt+ Cdp) )  -> R 
Table 4: Equation for positive outcomes. 
The terms contained in the hypothesis are bold. Extensions of these terms in narrow print. 
